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 No ship sails alone; this project was no different.  My encouraging wife, Dana, 
and my patient daughters, Dakota, Demi, and Daphne, helped me to cast off all lines and 
set sail.  They maintained my storeroom and ensured that shipboard maintenance was 
current.  Most importantly, they weathered the heavy storms, and never complained, even 
when the seas were high.  As we pull into safe harbor, I present to them my unconditional 
love and unqualified gratitude for the difficult supporting role to which they so graciously 
and carefully attended. 
 There were many lighthouses and navigational aids along the journey.  Two 
wonderful civilians, Ms. Suzanne Gonzales and Mr. Dale Sigman, helped to steer me 
through the murky waters of outsourcing policies.  Navy Captain Susan Sherman and Mr. 
Mark Dye provided me with metaphoric charts of the turbulent ocean of specific 
manpower analysis.  I am also grateful to Navy Lieutenant Commander Mike Mclean for 
introducing me to the Enterprise Data Warehouse.  Special thanks are extended to Navy 
Commander Paul Simpson for providing me with the most accurate soundings related to 
programming figures, and for connecting me with the previous lighthouse coordinates. 
 Out of all of the chaplains who were kind enough to sail with me, two deserve 
special mention.  Chaplain George Clifford and Chaplain Timothy Lantz were invaluable 
as sources of information, inspiration, and necessary criticism.  Their genuine assistance 
to a project that ultimately recommends their transfer to commercial craft is 
commendable and speaks volumes about the character of their community.  They both 
provided stabilizing forces when my rudder would swing, and I would have surely run 
aground without their assistance. 
 Professor Nicholas Dew provided the impetus for the initial voyage planning 
phase of this expedition.  What began as a short outing in his class has turned into the 
extended log entry which you are about to read.  I am grateful for his dedicated efforts at 
making sure the course was charted correctly; he has certainly contributed to the success 
of this cruise. 
I have saved my biggest thanks for the ship’s Captain.  Professor David R. 
Henderson supported this voyage from the day I approached him with an outline.  He has 
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selflessly shared his expertise in sailing these waters, and allowed me to take the helm 
through much of the trip.  He always ensured that my compass was calibrated, and never 
let me stray far off course.  His kind, encouraging words empowered me to continue 
sailing, even when dark clouds rolled in and the morning skies had been red.  This project 
exists because of his willingness to lead as a mentor, a guide, and a friend.  I am 
unreservedly indebted to his wisdom, and I can only hope that I was as worthy an 
apprentice as he was a master. 
At the end of the day, I am certain to have forgotten someone, and if that someone 
is reading this, then I offer special thanks to you.  The fatigue from the trip is already 
wearing off as I prepare for a period of dry dock maintenance.  My family and I will 
enjoy our brief respite for now while we regale each other with tall tales from the distant 
lands to which we have most recently traveled.  Perhaps we will journey together again 




The Department of Defense (DOD) has scarce resources and must continually 
make decisions on what new programs to fund and what obsolete/unnecessary programs 
to eliminate or modify.  Specifically, with regard to manpower issues, there are many 
jobs within the military that could be outsourced or restructured for a financial savings 
without a reduction in quality.  One of these potential jobs is that of the U.S. Navy 
chaplain.  The U.S. Navy maintains a Chaplain Corps for the purposes of ministering to 
service members and providing for their individual spiritual needs.  Navy chaplains 
ensure that all service members are afforded the opportunity to freely exercise their 
religious beliefs.  However, this paper investigates (1) whether or not this function must 
necessarily be performed by a commissioned officer and (2) whether a substantial savings 
could be realized to the United States taxpayer without sacrificing any of the rights of 
religious freedom. 
1. The Underlying Issues 
Primarily, this analysis is performed in the interests of economic efficiency.  This 
conceivably biases the reader into thinking that the decision to outsource or restructure 
the chaplains is one of a mostly quantitative nature.  However, there are a number of 
relevant qualitative reasons for undertaking this analysis.  The dollar figures, while 
important, are not the only issue.  There are highly contentious issues involved such as 
the interpretation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the 
ramifications of pluralistic ministry, and the potential effects of subjecting a service-
oriented community to the pressures of careerism.  Outsourcing or restructuring the 
Chaplain Corps would have consequences related to these issues. 
a. The First Amendment 
Theoretically, military chaplains exist to support the free exercise clause 
in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”  This 
is suggested in numerous directives governing religious ministry in the military.  The 
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Secretary of Defense (in DOD Directive 1304.19), the Secretary of the Navy (in 
SECNAV Instruction 1730.7B), and the Chief of Naval Operations (in OPNAV 
Instruction 1730.1D) all state that chaplains provide for the “free exercise of religion” for 
all Department of the Navy members, their families, and other authorized personnel.1  
Chaplains with whom the author spoke all cite the First Amendment in justifying the 
existence of a Chaplain Corps.  The logic seems to be that the military is a unique 
environment in which the United States government is potentially subjecting its military 
members to circumstances that could prohibit their access to religious outlets.  Therefore, 
the government provides its service members with military chaplains to provide for the 
free exercise of religion.  Without the establishment of a Chaplain Corps, the government 
could be accused of denying military members their Constitutional entitlements. 
The particulars of prohibiting free exercise are the controversial aspect of 
the clause.  Is the government necessarily prohibiting sailors from free exercise by 
sending them on an extended deployment?  Does the length of the deployment matter 
(e.g. less than a week underway without religious representation is satisfactory)?  In 
today’s “All Volunteer Force,” where potential service members have a choice about 
whether or not to join the military, does this clause still justify a Chaplain Corps?  For 
shore-based service members, is this clause in jeopardy of being violated by not 
providing a military chaplain if the civilian sector contains adequate religious facilities?  
It is the author’s view that the DOD’s interpretation of the First Amendment is flawed.  
There may be instances where the government is sending a service member into an 
environment devoid of the opportunity to freely exercise (e.g. combat), but it is doubtful 
that this applies to all forms of duty that a service member may encounter.  It is also 
uncertain that a military chaplain is the most efficient way to provide for this service. 
b. Pluralism 
Another issue is the dilemma of pluralism.  The diversity of faith groups 
within the United States military dictates the need for chaplains who are able to 
adequately respond to a wide variety of religious needs.  A ship comprised of 350 sailors 
 
1 These directives in their entirety may be found online.  The DOD Directive may be found at 
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d130419x.htm> (accessed 25 August 2005), and the 
Navy Instructions may be found at <http://neds.daps.dla.mil/Directives/dirindex.html> (accessed 25 August 
2005). 
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may only have one chaplain onboard to minister to the multitude of represented faiths.  
Pluralism is the government solution to this predicament.  It is not a religion; rather, it is 
the environment in which military chaplains must operate.  It is often touted as the 
essence of uniqueness that requires the specific brand of military clergy to support this 
diverse atmosphere.  Pluralism requires that chaplains are tolerant and respectful of all 
recognized religions, regardless of ideological differences.  As one chaplain whom the 
author interviewed stated, “I do not have to endorse the pluralistic environment, but I 
must be able to function within it.”  Military chaplains are not required to hold services 
for all religions; they are charged with assisting and facilitating the free expression of all 
service members’ religious beliefs.  If a military chaplain cannot personally fulfill a 
service member’s needs, then that chaplain will find someone who can. 
Pluralism comes with its own baggage, however.  As a corollary to the 
first issue, chaplains must walk a fine line between sharing their own brand of faith and 
violating the “establishment” portion of the First Amendment.  Certain faiths eschew 
pluralism, viewing it as a false religion.  This presents an ethical dilemma for a chaplain 
who subscribes to one of these faith groups.  This problem surfaced during the spring of 
2005 at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado.  There were charges of 
evangelical military preachers forcing their religious views onto uninterested cadets.  The 
Department of the Air Force completed a formal investigation and found no “overt 
religious discrimination, but a failure to fully accommodate all members’ needs and a 
lack of awareness over where the line is drawn between permissible and impermissible 
expression of beliefs.”2  Excluding clergy who will not submit to a pluralistic 
environment is not sufficient.  Ironically, to exclude these religious representatives from 
the process would also be a failure to accommodate. 
Pluralism is not only the environment in which the military operates; it is 
the environment in which the United States of America operates.  As people continue to 
broaden and expand their religious views, the military will have to continue to 
accommodate and support these views.  At some point, the question must be asked, “How 
 
2 The full report can be found at <http://www.af.mil/pdf/HQ_Review_Group_Report.pdf> (accessed 
22 July 2005). 
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much religious care and feeding must the United States government give to its military 
members?”  It would be extremely cost prohibitive and impractical to provide religious 
representation for every faith.  To the DOD’s credit, the resolution to create a chaplaincy 
able to deal with a pluralistic environment is commendable.  However, it is the author’s 
view that pluralism creates situations that should be avoided if possible.  An outsourced 
or restructured Chaplain Corps is one possible way of avoiding some of these concerns. 
c. Careerism and Bureaucracy 
The calling to the profession of chaplains is centered on service to people.  
It is normally viewed as a selfless mission that is characterized by the subordination of 
personal desires in order to focus on the needs of the people for whom they serve.  
However, creating commissioned officers out of members of the cloth creates a potential 
conflict of interests.  As commissioned officers, military chaplains undergo the same 
types of promotion cycles as all officers.  This adds an interesting area of concern for a 
military chaplain.  Promotion is based on many factors such as diversity of duty stations, 
fitness reports from Commanding Officers, and relative standing among peers, to name a 
few.  The allure of personal advancement is human nature.  It is reasonable to suppose 
that a military chaplain could focus on promotion at the expense of ministry.3
Additionally, this type of thinking creates bureaucracy as the career needs 
of the group of chaplains must be protected.  The management of this religious diversity 
has created large support systems to maintain a steady supply of chaplains.  There are 
training commands, recruiting stations, and administrative bodies.  Building a community 
of chaplains creates interesting relationships between the U.S. government and its 
nation’s churches.  For the U.S. government to avoid becoming entangled in the 
“establishment” clause, private brokers have emerged to act as middlemen, screening and 
referring candidates to the individual military branches for consideration as future 
chaplains.4  Bureaucracies are created to manage more bureaucracies.  The Office of the 
 
3 There are currently outstanding lawsuits brought against the United States Navy by a group of 
disgruntled Navy chaplains who claim that they were discriminated against on their promotion boards.  The 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia’s opinion granting class action to these lawsuits 
can be found at <http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/2002/Urbina/00-566d.pdf> (accessed 26 August 
2005). 
4 An example of these brokers is the National Conference on Ministry to the Armed Forces (NCAMF).  
Their website can be found at < http://www.ncmaf.org/> (accessed 26 August 2005). 
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Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness maintains an Armed Forces 
Chaplains Board, which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of all service 
chaplaincies.  Each branch of the military has its own Chaplain Corps, along with its own 
facility to train them.  The government, to accommodate its service members’ religious 
needs, has created a sizeable annual expenditure for the U.S. taxpayers.  Outsourcing or 
restructuring the Chaplain Corps could mitigate many of these outlays. 
B. SCOPE 
This paper addresses a concentrated portion of the issue.  While there is a 
Chaplain Corps in each major branch of the United States military, this thesis investigates 
only the Department of the Navy’s community of chaplains.  This community is further 
divided by the type of duty performed. 
1. Shore Duty, Sea Duty, and Combat Duty 
Within the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps’ list of possible duty stations, there are 
three broad options.  Option one is to be stationed at a shore-based activity without the 
normal obligation to leave for deployments and exercises.  These duty stations are Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard bases worldwide, military service academies, and various 
administrative positions.  Option two is to be stationed onboard a United States Ship 
(USS) as a permanent member of the crew, or to be stationed at a squadron that oversees 
many ships or aircraft.  These duty stations usually require chaplains to leave their 
homeport for extended deployments and exercises.  Option three is to be embedded with 
a Marine Corps force for ground combat duty. 
For the purposes of this study, chaplains involved in ground combat duty will not 
be included.  Sending troops into combat is a unique situation in which it would be 
difficult to argue for the removal of chaplains.  It is doubtful that civilian clergy would 
wish to perform these duties, and the monetary incentives required to attract contracted 
chaplains for combat would probably negate any financial savings.  Additionally, this is 
one situation in which the author would agree that the government is subjecting its 
military members to an environment devoid of the ability to exercise religious freedom.  
 6
                                                
In addition to these reasons, this decision is based on a number of relevant documents.5  
Therefore, the chaplains being analyzed in this paper are the shore-based and shipboard 
chaplains within the Department of the Navy. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
Overall, an argument is made for the restructuring of the U.S. Navy Chaplain 
Corps.  This is done on the basis of economic savings and the lack of a demonstrated 
necessity for religious representation in areas which provide sufficient opportunities for 
worship.  Outsourcing is presented as another avenue to obtain financial savings due to 
the demonstrated lack of difference between the duties of military chaplains and civilian 
clergy.  However, outsourcing is shown to be an inferior approach.  There is also 
additional information exploring the logic behind the preservation of a Chaplain Corps. 
The thesis proceeds as follows.  Chapter II offers some historical insight on both 
the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps and outsourcing in general.  In addition, the Lay Leader 
Program and a guideline to the manpower coding scheme used for Navy chaplains is 
included in this chapter.  Chapter III discusses the requirements, training, and duties of 
Navy chaplains and civilian clergy.  These religious leaders are then contrasted with one 
another in order to establish their differences.  Chapter IV outlines a cost effectiveness 
analysis comparing Navy chaplains to civilian clergy.  Additionally, an explanation of the 
difficulty in quantifying benefits is included in this chapter.  Chapter V estimates the 
financial gains associated with outsourcing or restructuring the Chaplain Corps.  The 
problems of outsourcing are addressed in this chapter.  Chapter VI discusses the obstacles 
to change, and investigates the rationale behind the Chaplain Corps’ efforts at creating 
value for themselves in the 21st century Navy.  Chapter VII completes the thesis with the 
conclusions of the study and gives recommendations for further research. 
 
5 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 protect the status of military chaplains during armed conflict.  The 
U.S. government has decided that this protection could be in jeopardy if civilian clergy are used.  For a 
formal statement of this policy see the Navy’s Strategic Sourcing Branch Fiscal Year 2004 IG&CA 
Manpower Mix Criteria document, Attachment 1.1.4 of Enclosure (3) Military Medical and Chaplain 
Services for Prisoners of War, which can be found online at 
<http://strategicsourcing.navy.mil/StrategicSourcing.cfm?doc=25> (accessed 26 August 2005). 
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II. THE U.S. NAVY CHAPLAIN CORPS / OUTSOURCING 101 
A. HISTORY 
Chaplains in the United States Navy date back to November, 1775, when the 
second article of U.S. Navy Regulations was implemented.  It stated that “the 
Commanders of the ships of the Thirteen United Colonies are to take care that divine 
services be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon be preached on board on 
Sundays."6  Over the years, the status of the Chaplain Corps has evolved, and it has 
grown into an agency with its own buildings, staff, and annual budget.  In 1906, the 
Secretary of the Navy formally established the Chaplain Corps by enacting standards for 
consideration as a chaplain, creating an infrastructure for the training of a military 
chaplain, and appointing a Chief of Chaplains to oversee this new agency’s 
administration.7  The most recent compilation of the rules and regulations governing the 
Chaplain Corps is Naval Warfare Publication 1-05, Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy, 
dated August of 2003.  This publication outlines the entire structure and organization of 
administering religious programs within the Navy. 
The Chaplain Corps has turned into a bureaucracy with such varied titles as Staff 
Chaplain, Fleet Chaplain, Regional Chaplain, Supervisory Chaplain, Coordinating 
Chaplain, and simply Chaplain.  As of 05 July 2005, there were 903 Active Duty Navy 
chaplains.8  These chaplains serve the United States Navy, the United States Marine 
Corps, and the United States Coast Guard at all of their shore establishments, aboard a 
select group of ships, and in the field with forward deployed units.  Their primary 
function is to provide for the free exercise of religion for all members and families of 
these three services.  Roughly one third, or almost 300, of these chaplains are operational, 
 
6 William and Thomas Bradford, Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies of North-
America, (Philadelphia, 1775; reprinted Washington, DC: Naval Historical Foundation, 1944). 
7 This authorization for this is contained in Title 10, Section 5142 of the United States Code. 
8 “White Pages,” edited by LCDR Andrew Wade.  This document is available at Navy Knowledge 
Online (NKO) under the section for Chaplain Corps directories. A username and password are required. 
<https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/templates/page/library.jsp?foldId=libfold11340027> (accessed 22 July 
2005). 
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meaning they are attached to a ship or unit that leaves the country for duty overseas or in 
hostile areas.  The other two thirds, or about 600 chaplains, serve on Navy, Marine Corps, 
or Coast Guard Bases around the world, and do not normally deploy or enter hostile 
areas.  These chaplains serve in a supporting capacity.  As alluded to in Chapter I, there is 
a convenient way to differentiate between these types of chaplains.  Operational 
chaplains are on “sea duty” (to include those in combat situations) and supporting 
chaplains are on “shore duty.”  It is notable that the distribution of sea versus shore 
chaplains is heavily weighted in favor of shore billets.  Most of these shore billets are in 
populated areas with sufficient civilian religious resources within a reasonable distance. 
As of March 2000, over 70 individual faith groups were represented in the U.S. 
Navy Chaplain Corps.  The corps currently divides its members into four distinct faith 
groupings: Roman Catholic, Liturgical Protestant, Non-liturgical Protestant, and Special 
Worship Consideration.9  Liturgical refers to the existence of a set group of rituals or 
formal ceremonies inherent in the worship practices of these faiths.  These are faiths such 
as Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Episcopalian, or Orthodox.  Non-liturgical faiths do 
not have these rituals.  These are faiths such as Southern Baptist, Pentecostal, Church of 
the Nazarene, Church of Christ, or Evangelicals.  Special Worship faiths refer to any non-
Christian faith group, such as Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu.  The Navy does not 
keep readily accessible records on specific denominations of individual chaplains. 
1. The Lay Leader Program 
Chaplains often enlist the help of interested sailors to be “lay leaders” when there 
is a demonstrated need for the facilitation of religious services which cannot be delivered 
by the chaplain.  Various classes of Naval ships do not have embarked chaplains.  Out of 
286 deployable battle force ships, only 61 of these ships have chaplains attached as 
permanent crew members.10  Almost 80 percent of Naval ships are without a permanent 
chaplain, and these ships often have lay leaders to handle the religious needs of the crew.  
 
9 Karen D. Smith, et al., Center for Naval Analyses March 2000 report, Promotions in the Navy 
Chaplain Corps. 
10 The number of ships was taken from the Navy’s website, 
<http://www.navy.mil/palib/news/.www/status.html> (accessed 19 August 2005), and the number of ships 
with chaplains was taken from the “Yellow Pages” of the Navy Knowledge Online website, 
<https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/templates/page/library.jsp?foldId=libfold248061> (accessed 19 August 
2005). 
 9
                                                
These lay leaders undergo a process of selection and qualification that is particular to 
each individual command and religious affiliation.  There is no standardized training for 
lay leaders.  It is up to the command or staff chaplains to qualify individual lay leaders.11  
Lay leaders are not required to possess any formal religious training prior to 
consideration.  They need only demonstrate “volunteerism, high moral character, 
motivation, and religious interest.”12
Although lay leaders are not designed to replace chaplains, they are used in ways 
that allow service members to feel that their religious needs are being considered.  With 
the proper qualifications being met, lay leaders may perform certain religious services in 
times of necessity.  This raises the question of whether or not chaplains onboard Navy 
ships are essential.  If a properly trained and qualified lay leader can administer religious 
services in times of necessity, then it would seem reasonable to use this option during the 
underway periods of any Navy ship.  Additionally, the Navy does not seem to place a 
premium on shipboard chaplains, as only 21 percent of Navy ships have a permanent 
chaplain attached. 
B. OMB OUTSOURCING POLICY 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the department within the 
Executive branch of government that oversees the preparation and administration of the 
federal budget.  In addition, it routinely evaluates all federal programs and policies with 
regard to effectiveness and fiscal efficiency.  Per its Mission Statement, one of its 
primary goals is to “reduce any unnecessary burdens on the public.”13
OMB issues periodic literature called “Circulars,” which provide guidance and 
instruction to various federal agencies in the matters of financial management and 
procurement.  Circular A-76, “Performance of Commercial Activities,” has been 
continuously updated since its initial version in 1966.  The most recent update occurred 
 
11 The Navy instruction authorizing lay leaders is MILPERSMAN 1730-010 and can be accessed 
online at <http://buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/508/milpers/1730-010.htm> (accessed 18 August 
2005). 
12 MILPERSMAN 1730-010, Section 7a. 
13 Office of Management and Budget website, “OMB’s Mission,” 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization/role.html> (accessed 22 July 2005). 
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in May of 2003.  This document directs all federal agencies to scrutinize the functions 
they perform and classify them as “either commercial or inherently governmental.”14  
The original intent of A-76 was to prevent the United States government from infringing 
upon the livelihood of the commercial sector.  It provided a means to keep big 
government from monopolizing certain jobs and functions that could be done privately.  
Additionally, this good-faith initiative provided taxpayers with a demonstrated policy 
statement in support of responsible spending of public monies.  Circular A-76 helped to 
give birth to the phenomenon that has come to be known as “outsourcing.”  To a 
businessman, outsourcing usually refers to a transfer of company jobs to a less costly 
labor force.  To the federal government, outsourcing refers to a transfer of federal jobs to 
a civilian entity in the commercial sector. 
A-76 gives guidance for the specific procedures federal agencies must follow in 
order to outsource their jobs.  Agencies such as the Department of the Navy are required 
to inventory their jobs annually and submit a report classifying the jobs as inherently 
governmental or commercial.15  This inventory is often a subjective assessment by a 
member of the chosen agency who is designated as the Competitive Sourcing Official.  
Inherently governmental jobs are those that are “intimately related to the public 
interest”16 (the interests of National Security are often invoked here).  These jobs are 
mandated to be performed by government personnel.  If a job can be demonstrated to be 
classified as commercial, then the arduous process of competition begins.  The job must 
be advertised to the public, a series of bids must be submitted by interested parties, a 
comprehensive cost comparison must be performed, and a contract is then awarded.  
Another option is divestiture, which is ceasing to perform the job at all.  The whole 
process is designed to ensure that the American taxpayer is receiving the maximum value 




14 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76: “Performance of Commercial 
Activities,” (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 4.a. 
15 Ibid, Attachment A, A.2. 
16 Ibid, Attachment A, B.1.a. 
C. STRATEGIC SOURCING AND THE CODING OF NAVY CHAPLAINS 
As stated, one of the major issues surrounding the outsourcing of any federal job 
is its classification as inherently governmental or commercial.  Within the Department of 
the Navy’s N1 (Manpower and Personnel) Directorate is a Strategic Sourcing branch that 
oversees all aspects of the outsourcing of Navy jobs.  This branch issues annual guidance 
for this classification, using criteria derived from the OMB Circular A-76.17
Navy manpower is coded by the type of work being done.  The 2004 Inherently 
Governmental and Commercial Activity (IG & CA) Inventory Guidance is the most 
recent document detailing the procedures and codes utilized during this process of job 
scrutiny.18  Jobs are given “Manpower Mix Criteria” codes which serve as designations 
separating the inherently governmental jobs from the potentially commercial ones.  The 
information in Table 1 was taken from the Strategic Sourcing website, and contains the 
alphabetic codes and their general meanings. 
 
CODE MEANING IG or CA 
A Military Operations Inherently Governmental 
B Exemption for Military Support Elements in Operating Forces Commercial but Exempt 
C Exemption for Civilian Support Elements in Operating Forces Commercial but Exempt 
D Exemption for Military and Civilian Wartime Designations (Dual Status) Commercial but Exempt 
E Civilian Authority Direction and Control Inherently Governmental 
F Military Unique Knowledge and Skills Inherently Governmental 
G Exemption for Esprit de Corps and Military Support Commercial but Exempt 
H Exemption for Continuity of Infrastructure Operations Commercial but Exempt 
I Military Augmentation of the Infrastructure During War Inherently Governmental 
J Exemption for Civilian and Military Rotation Commercial but Exempt 
K Exemption for Civilian and Military Career Progression Commercial but Exempt 
L Exempted by Law, Executive Order, Treaty, or International Agreement Commercial but Exempt 
M Exempted by DOD Management Decision Commercial but Exempt 
P Pending Restructuring of Commercial Activities Commercial 
R Subject to Review for Competition Under A-76 Commercial 
X Alternative Candidates to A-76 Commercial 
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Table 1. Manpower Mix Criteria Codes. 
 
17 A flowchart detailing this process under “Decision Process Diagram” is on the Navy’s Strategic 
Sourcing website at <http://strategicsourcing.navy.mil/StrategicSourcing.cfm?doc=25> (accessed 22 July 
2005). 
18 This document and all enclosures may be accessed from the Strategic Sourcing website at 
<http://strategicsourcing.navy.mil/StrategicSourcing.cfm?doc=25> (accessed 22 July 2005). 
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As shown in Table 1, codes A, E, F, and I are inherently governmental and cannot 
be considered for outsourcing or divestiture.  Code A is related to the command and 
execution of combat operations; code E is related to civilian oversight mandated by the 
U.S. Code, such as the Secretary of the Navy; code F is related to jobs that require 
specific military training; code I is related to the Selected Reserve forces.  There are 
chaplains in the Department of the Navy within each of these codes. 
All other codes are considered commercial.  However, many of these remaining 
codes are not eligible for competition under A-76 because they are considered “military 
essential” or “civilian essential” (i.e. they must be performed by a federal employee).  
There are numerous reasons why a commercially coded job would not be eligible for 
competition within the commercial sector.  Codes B and C refer to supporting operations 
that are not normally involved in hostilities but have the potential to be involved; code D 
refers to jobs that are commercial in peacetime but become inherently governmental in 
wartime; code G refers to jobs that affect the morale of the force; code H refers to jobs 
that are needed for continuity of operations during a crisis due to some specialized 
training; codes J and K refer to career management and detailing issues associated with 
tour length and occupational progression; code L refers to jobs that are mandated by 
documents such as the U.S. Code or an international agreement; code M is an inclusive 
code that allows the DOD to protect jobs that they deem essential but are not covered by 
the other codes.  There are chaplains in each of these codes except for C, H, J, and M. 
Only three codes are considered commercial and subject to divestiture or private 
sector performance.  Code P refers to jobs that have a deferment from being reviewed 
pending the outcome of a restructuring decision; code R refers to jobs that are subject to 
the competitive processes outlined in A-76; code X normally refers to divestiture.  There 







                                                
1. Code G 
The bulk of Navy chaplains, over 50 percent, are considered code G.19  This is the 
code that refers to morale and esprit de corps.  The following excerpts are from Enclosure 
(3), Section 2.3 of the IG & CA document.  They are the Navy’s description of jobs that 
require this code: 
These exemptions are for functions that can be performed by DoD 
civilians or, in some cases, the private sector but without the same effect—
i.e., military performance of these activities carries special meaning for 
military personnel, their families, and the public.  This manpower is 
military essential and exempt from private sector performance because 
civilian and contract personnel cannot serve as military role models or be 
used as effectively to project a military presence or image or authentically 
demonstrate military expertise to the public. 
The decision not to outsource or divest chaplains under code G is based on the premise 
that a civilian chaplain would lack some intrinsic value not present without a military 
commission.  The Navy believes that a civilian chaplain would not have the same effect, 
and there would be a loss of unit cohesion if this job were to be lost to the private sector.  
Military presence and military expertise are theoretically required for the proper 
execution of a chaplain’s duties.  It is significant to note that the only mention of 
chaplains under this code within the IG & CA document refers to chaplains at military 
service academies.  It has somehow grown to include most chaplains at most shore 
establishments. 
Military chaplains who exist under code G are considered militarily essential and 
exempt from comparison with civilian counterparts.  This is a hurdle that must be 
overcome in order to evaluate the potential cost savings to the taxpayer, which is the 
fundamental objective of A-76.  The premise of code G for military chaplains is noble, 
and the intent is to ensure the best possible support for U.S. service members.  However, 
it is difficult for the author to understand how military expertise is required for effective 
performance of a chaplain’s duties.  This is the subject of further investigation in Chapter 
III. 
 
19 This percentage calculated from information furnished to the author by the Strategic Sourcing 
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III. WHAT MAKES A MILITARY CHAPLAIN? 
A. THE NATURE OF THE JOB 
The duties of Navy chaplains are numerous and varied.  The wide range of a 
chaplain’s responsibilities requires a great deal of training and education.  One of the 
most relevant issues in this research is whether or not a chaplain’s job must necessarily 
be performed by a commissioned officer.  This chapter analyzes the process of becoming 
a military chaplain in an attempt to identify the differences between military chaplains 
and civilian clergy.  Additionally, the duties of a military chaplain are examined to 
distinguish them from duties that a civilian chaplain could perform.  As previously 
mentioned, the duties of a “battlefield” chaplain are not considered in this analysis, for 
reasons already discussed.  The focus of this analysis is on shipboard and shore-based 
chaplains. 
1. Requirements for Entry 
The requirements for becoming a U.S. Navy chaplain are almost identical to the 
requirements for becoming a regular commissioned officer in any of the other officer 
communities.  Prospective candidates must be within certain age parameters, pass a 
physical health assessment, and have an undergraduate degree from an accredited 
institution of learning.  Additionally, candidates must have the following20: 
• At least 72 hours of graduate level work with at least 36 of those hours in 
a field of theological or related studies.  This requirement may be fulfilled 
with a Master of Divinity (M.Div.) degree from an accredited institution. 
• An ecclesiastical endorsement from a legitimate faith group recognized by 
the Department of Defense. 
• At least 2 years of ministry experience. 
There is also a program which allows theology students to join before they are 
ordained in a particular faith group.21  They then complete their residency in the service 
 
20 These requirements may be found online at the Navy’s recruiting website, 
<http://www.navy.com/officer/clergy> (accessed 10 August 2005), or online at the Naval Chaplains School 
website, <https://www.npdc.navy.mil/css/chaplain/index.cfm> (accessed 10 August 2005). 
21 The particulars of the Chaplain Candidate Program Officer (CCPO) Program may be found at the 
Naval Chaplains School website, <https://www.npdc.navy.mil/css/chaplain/index.cfm> (accessed 10 
August 2005). 
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of the military and apply for the title of “Chaplain.”  This postgraduate education and 
extra experience entitles chaplains to begin military service at a paygrade higher than that 
obtained by a typical newly commissioned officer, most often O2 or O3 rather than the 
usual O1.22
2. Training Pipeline 
Once the basic entry requirements are met, candidates attend a series of training 
courses designed to indoctrinate new chaplains into a military environment.  There are 
four basic courses, which are administered at the Naval Education and Training 
Command in Newport, Rhode Island23: 
• Naval Chaplain Basic Course (NCBT) is a six-week long course of 
instruction which familiarizes new chaplains with military customs and 
procedures.  They learn to wear a uniform properly, identify rank 
structure, and begin the process of integrating into military culture.  This 
provides a basis of knowledge for chaplains in their role as junior officers. 
• Division Officer Capstone (DOC) is a one-week long course of instruction 
that provides leadership and management training.  The focus of this 
course is on fleet management practices and is intended to prepare 
chaplains for Division Officer responsibilities. 
• Amphibious/Expeditionary Course (AMEX) is a nine-day long course of 
instruction designed to acquaint chaplains with the roles and 
responsibilities of working with expeditionary forces such as the Marine 
Corps. 
• Tools, Empowerment, and Ministry Skills Course (TEAMS) is a two-
week long course of instruction that provides chaplains with the 
knowledge and skills to successfully administer a Command Religious 
Program upon transfer to their next duty station.  It is designed to reduce 
the learning curve, and help new chaplains begin their ministry 
immediately. 
These combined courses take roughly two and one half months to complete before new 
chaplains are assigned to their first tour of duty on a ship or at a military base.  Ten weeks 
of training are what separate civilian clergy from newly commissioned military chaplains. 
 
 
22 The current pay chart for all military members can be found at the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service’s website, <http://www.dod.mil/dfas/money/milpay/pay/paytable2005-rev1.pdf> (accessed 10 
August 2005).  
23 Further information on these courses can be found at the Naval Chaplains School website, 
<https://www.npdc.navy.mil/css/chaplain/index.cfm> (accessed 10 August 2005). 
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3. Religious Duties 
The May 2003 OPNAV Instruction 1730.1D, Religious Ministry in the Navy, 
provides guidance for the administration of a religious program at an individual 
command.24  This instruction assigns chaplains to a Religious Ministry Team (RMT), 
which consists of a group of personnel responsible for delivering religious services.  
There are six specific tasks allocated to chaplains and their assistants: 
• Command Advisory is a task which addresses the responsibility to advise 
and counsel the commanding officer on all matters of a religious nature.  
This includes issues of discrimination, ethical matters, and command 
morale.  Additionally, in an operational context, a chaplain would be a key 
advisor on foreign cultural issues related to religion. 
• Religious Ministry and Accommodation is a task which addresses the 
responsibility to provide for the free exercise of religious services.  This 
includes understanding the specific religious needs of the command, and 
then scheduling worship services to meet these needs.  These are the tasks 
most readily identified with any chaplain: conducting mass, burial 
services, weddings, baptisms, etc.  Additionally, this task directs chaplains 
to establish a Lay Leader program when necessary. 
• Outreach is a task which addresses the coordination of humanitarian and 
spiritual growth activities among service members, within defined 
geographic areas, and in conjunction with other RMTs.  This task deals 
with the organization of various retreats for service members and their 
families.  The Chaplains Religious Enrichment Development Operation 
(CREDO), which is a series of spiritual retreats, is a function of this task. 
• Pastoral Care is a task which refers to the counseling and care of 
individual service members and their families.  This task encompasses 
hospital visits, crisis intervention, and spiritual mentoring.  Additionally, 
this task directs chaplains to deal with applications for conscientious 
objector status. 
• Training and Education is a task which assigns chaplains to conduct 
training in matters of ethics, values, morals, and character development.  
This task also includes discussions of suicide prevention, domestic abuse, 
drug use, and other related issues.  Also, the oversight of traditional study 
of scripture is incorporated into this task. 
• Supervisory and Management is a task which addresses the managerial 
aspects of running a Command Religious Program.  It deals with the 
supervision of religious personnel, budgeting for resources, and 
contracting for needed religious services when necessary.  
24 This instruction can be viewed online at the Navy Electronic Directives System website, 
<http://neds.daps.dla.mil/Directives/1730_1d.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2005). 
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B. THE DUTIES OF CIVILIAN CLERGY 
It is difficult to establish a standardized set of religious duties for civilian clergy 
due to the enormous diversity in faiths.  However, there are many resources from which 
to draw a reasonable approximation.  The Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) issues a 
biennial publication, the Occupational Outlook Handbook, which contains information 
on hundreds of careers within the United States.25  Within the 2004-2005 edition of this 
handbook is a designation for “Clergy.”  The following quote is taken from the section 
entitled “Nature of the Work”: 
Clergy are religious and spiritual leaders and teachers…They organize and 
lead regular religious services and officiate at special ceremonies… They 
may lead worshippers in prayer, administer the sacraments, deliver 
sermons...organize, supervise, and lead religious education programs… 
visit the sick or bereaved to provide comfort…counsel persons who are 
seeking religious or moral guidance…oversee the management of 
buildings, order supplies, contract for services and repairs, and supervise 
the work of staff and volunteers.  Clergy also work with committees and 
officials, elected by the congregation, who guide the management of the 
congregation’s finances and real estate.26
C. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A “CIVILIAN CHAPLAIN” 
There does not appear to be much difference between the duties of military 
chaplains and civilian clergy.  Both have the requisite training to be a legitimate member 
of a faith group, as the Navy requires this training prior to commissioning.  Although the 
aforementioned ten weeks of basic training is probably necessary for an introduction to 
the military, the real indoctrination happens at the duty station to which a new chaplain is 
assigned.  This type of indoctrination would happen whether or not the chaplain had been 
commissioned.  Experience as a teacher does not differentiate between military and 
civilian.  A civilian chaplain would receive the same skills and abilities that “on the job” 
training provides as would a military chaplain with ten weeks of experience. 
With the exception of Command Advisory, both military chaplains and civilian 
clergy provide for five of the six tasks that the Department of the Navy has deemed to be 
 
25 The current (2004-2005) issue may be found online at the BLS website, 
<http://www.bls.gov/oco/home.htm> (accessed 10 August 2005). 
26 <http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos250.htm> (accessed 10 August 2005). 
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essential for chaplains.  The fulfillment of the Command Advisory task by civilian 
chaplains requires an understanding of the religious nature surrounding the area of 
operations, and it is not unreasonable to assume that a civilian chaplain could fulfill this 
task upon request.  Moreover, the military portion of the Command Advisory task seems 
to be most necessary for chaplains embedded with a Marine force in a foreign country, 
and these chaplains are not being considered for restructuring in this study.  Neither 
shipboard chaplains nor chaplains attached to shore commands would need to fulfill this 
task in ways different from a civilian chaplain.  With regard to all tasks, military 
knowledge would be helpful, but is not required for effectiveness. 
Chaplains with whom the author has discussed this tend to disagree with the 
author’s evaluation above.  They contend that the uniform conveys a sense of community 
that would be lost if a service member did not feel that chaplains could empathize with 
the military lifestyle.  They site many examples.  They hold that there must be military 
chaplains at the service academies and boot camps in order to convey a sense of total 
immersion into the military lifestyle.  Military chaplains are supposedly essential at all 
hospitals to ensure that the sick and wounded service members and their families feel as 
if the military “family” is truly taking care of them physically and spiritually.  When a 
service member dies, it is allegedly more appropriate to have a military chaplain 
approach the next of kin to deliver the bad news.  The existence of the civil-military 
gap27 is invoked and military chaplains are purported to provide a bridge across this gap, 
being able to understand the viewpoints of each side.  A chaplain is deemed essential to 
assist in the transition from civilian life to military life, and if the chaplain has not made 
that transition, then that chaplain is less effective. 
In this author’s view, however, the real difference between military chaplains and 
civilian clergy is the demographic makeup of their congregations.  However, military 
members are human beings with human problems and issues.  They suffer hardship, have 
domestic troubles, sometimes travel away from loved ones, deal with difficult coworkers, 
 
27 The civil-military gap is a difference in ideological thinking between military members and 
civilians, and has been the subject of study since the Vietnam War era.  A thorough account of this alleged 
gap may be found at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies website, 
<http://www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/> (accessed 10 August 2005). 
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lose family and friends, etc.  With the exception of perhaps combat, troubles do not 
discriminate between members of the military and the civilian population.  To argue that 
military chaplains are essential by virtue of their membership in the military is to deny 
the humanity of the military community.  Superior to membership in any organization is 
the ability to relate on a human level, an ability that all clergy possess in varying degrees.  
The argument should be based on economic grounds surrounding the value (or lack of 
value) of a civilian chaplain in a military setting.  There does not appear to be a sufficient 
difference in benefits to offset the potentially significant savings in costs.  These benefits 
and costs are the subject of the next chapter. 
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IV. BENEFITS AND COSTS 
A. BENEFITS 
Classic Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) states the importance of quantifying the 
individual costs and individual benefits for a measurable comparison.  If the net benefit 
(total benefits minus total costs) is positive, then that proposal is generally viewed as a 
worthwhile venture (in economic terms).  Conversely, if the net benefit is negative, then 
the proposal in question is probably not worth undertaking.  The difficulty with this 
approach, in this instance, is in accurately measuring the benefits of a purely military or 
civilian chaplaincy.  In order to properly compare dollar amounts, the benefits must be 
quantifiable in dollars.  However, it is difficult to quantify how much it means to a 
service member to have a military chaplain onboard before he launches a lethal 
Tomahawk missile into a populated area.  It is equally difficult to quantify the preference 
a service member may have in talking to a civilian chaplain who is not part of the chain 
of command.  On a larger and more relevant scale, the benefit accrued to the individual 
taxpayer is nearly impossible to quantify; there are as many calculations as there are faith 
groups.  These types of benefits are highly subjective in nature and could range from a 
few dollars to an infinite amount of money.28
This difficulty in quantifying benefits is not completely problematic because the 
intent of outsourcing or restructuring is not to rid the entire U.S. Navy of religious 
representation.  The intent is to gain the most value.  Therefore, it is assumed that 
religious representation will be present regardless of whether or not that representative is 
a member of the U.S. Navy.  This representation would take the form of contracted 
chaplains in an outsourcing scenario and local civilian clergy in a restructuring scenario.  
For the purposes of analysis, this allows the benefits of either alternative to be relatively 
equal.  Any inequality would be marginal due to the similarity in duties and small 
differences in benefits. 
 
28 The possibility exists, of course, for these benefits to be negative.  Some service members, 
presumably a small minority, may have a genuine distaste for military chaplains, which would make the 
presence of such chaplains a negative benefit, that is, a loss. 
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Of course, the equality of benefits is the most contested piece of this analysis.  
Just as the Navy chaplains with whom the author spoke disagreed about the sameness of 
job descriptions, they also challenged the author’s opinion about benefits.  Navy 
chaplains believe that civilian religious leaders are generally unfamiliar with the unique 
military environment, and they cite civilian religious communities that are reluctant to 
accept military members because of their transient lifestyle.  They contend that civilian 
clergy are not properly trained to deal with the nuances of military culture.  Some of them 
make emotional appeals to the value of military chaplains by virtue of their existence 
within the confines of the “military installations where our people work, play, live, pray, 
laugh, cry, and worship.  They understand from the inside.”29  This assessment may be 
accurate, but these supposed benefits are still unable to be quantified in any real sense.  
Additionally, it is the author’s empirical opinion that this disparity of benefits continues 
to exist only on the margin. 
Consider the benefits inherent in shipboard and shore-based chaplaincies.  
Shipboard military chaplains possess the benefit of being able to deal with deployments, 
but very few ships regularly employ chaplains.30  If there were significant benefits to 
having military chaplains onboard ships, is it unreasonable to wonder why each Navy 
ship does not have one?  With regard to shore-based military chaplains, their benefits are 
more difficult to articulate.  They are required to minister to congregations that have 
specific military issues, but non-military members have no cognitive barrier to 
understanding these issues.  It is reasonable to assume that civilian clergy encounter 
many people within their congregations who lead lifestyles with which they have no 
personal experience.  Would a clergyman, for example, be unable to minister to a police 
officer because the clergyman has never been one himself?  Similarly, it seems 
unreasonable to assume that a military chaplain could understand all military issues by 
virtue of being a commissioned officer.  As stated, the benefits of a chaplain as a 
 
29 Excerpt taken from the text of an e-mail correspondence between the author and a senior chaplain at 
the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 30 August 2005. 
30 As stated in Chapter II, only 21 percent of Navy ships include chaplains as permanent crew 
members. 
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commissioned officer are difficult to establish on a ship or ashore, and they seem fairly 
indistinguishable from the same benefits provided by civilian clergy. 
1. CBA versus CEA 
When benefits can be assumed to be roughly identical, a Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis (CEA) can be used as a proxy for the CBA.  Although this is a contested 
opinion, the author believes sufficient evidence has been shown to infer the similarities 
between military chaplains and civilian clergy.  Using this as the benchmark, the relevant 
costs of each alternative are tallied and the alternative with the lowest costs should be 
selected as the most efficient course of action. 
B. COSTS 
There are many relevant costs associated with manpower issues.  For simplicity, 
and due to the fact that there will still be religious representation within the ranks, certain 
costs will be removed from the analysis because of their similarity among alternative 
courses of action.  For instance, there would still be recruiting, training, and travel costs, 
regardless of the source of chaplains.31  Therefore, the relevant costs are reduced to 
annual salary (including the monetized health, quality of life, and retirement benefits), 
and a comparison is made between military chaplains and civilian clergy. 
1. Salary for a Military Chaplain 
When the Navy programs the cost of manpower for a select group of personnel, it 
aggregates them across paygrades and averages out the cost per individual sailor to yield 
a composite figure.  The bulk of this cost is reflected in three items: basic pay, housing 
allowances, and subsistence allowances.  This figure also takes into account all implicit 
and explicit benefits.  These benefits include health care (medical and dental), retirement 
accrual, commissary and exchange privileges, on-base services (gymnasium, pool, 
recreational centers, etc.), disability insurance, legal services, educational opportunities, 
30 days paid vacation, and various tax advantages. 
 
31 Arguably, outsourcing or restructuring would reduce these costs because there would be fewer 
personnel to recruit, train, and transport.  The difficulty in assessing these costs, and their assumed 
marginality, compel the author to omit them from this initial analysis.  However, they are addressed briefly 
in Chapter V. 
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This process yields a simple figure for assessing manpower costs.  For officers in 
the United States Navy in fiscal year 2005, the annual cost per officer is $114,775.32  
This includes all officers from all communities.  Since all chaplains are commissioned 
officers, these figures apply to them.  However, due to the higher-than-average education 
a chaplain has before he enters the military, his paygrade is often higher than that of a 
normally accessed officer.  This skews the results of their aggregate pay figure to the 
right; in other words, the pay figure estimated with the above methodology is too low 
relative to the real figure for chaplains.  In the absence of an exact amount for chaplains, 
the programming rate for all officers will be used. 
2. Salary for Civilian Clergy 
There are literally hundreds of faith groups in the United States.  Even within 
faith groups, there are organized divisions, and the vast majority of these organizations 
has someone who holds an official clergy position.  May, 2004 data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) estimated 35,790 employed members of the cloth.33  This actually 
seems quite small, considering that there are over two hundred thousand distinct 
congregations (mostly Christian) in the United States.34  However, the BLS estimates do 
not include self-employed clergy, who may comprise a significant portion of clergy 
nationwide. 
There are large discrepancies with regard to clergy compensation.  The BLS data 
place the mean salary at $40,000.  (The May 2004 data for BLS dollar figures are 
aggregated across six previous semiannual periods, and benchmarked to 2004 dollars.  
This provides a large enough sample to maintain reliable salary estimates.  To properly 
compare dollar amounts in 2005 dollars, this figure is inflation adjusted.  This adjustment 
yields a BLS mean salary of $41,207.)  A 2003 study on clergy compensation undertaken 
by the Divinity School at Duke University placed the median salary of Catholic priests at 
 
32 Data supplied in Excel spreadsheet format by Commander Paul Simpson, OPNAV 102C Manpower 
and Personnel Analysis Section Head at the Navy Annex, Washington, D.C. (07 April 2005). 
33 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Employment Statistics, Clergy, 
<http://bls.gov/oes/current/oes212011.htm> (accessed 29 July 2005). 
34 These figures taken from a 1990 study undertaken by the Association of Statisticians of American 
Religious Bodies (ASARB), entitled, “Churches and Church Membership in the United States 
1990,”<http://www.thearda.com/RCMS/ccm1990.pdf> (accessed 29 July 2005). 
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$25,000 and the median salary of Protestant priests at $40,000 (all salary figures reported 
from the Duke study include housing).  The percentile salary range in this study was from 
$16,500 (the tenth-percentile salary for Catholics) to $68,000 (the 90th-percentile range 
for Protestants).35 (These figures represent data taken from the year 2000.  Inflation 
adjusting to the year 2005 puts the Catholic median salary at $28,252, the Protestant 
median salary at $45,203, and the salary range from $18,646 to $76,845.)  Various 
denominations distribute literature aimed at helping individual congregations decide how 
much to pay their clergy.36  Heavily regulated churches, such as the Roman Catholic 
Church, have strict guidelines with regard to compensation and benefits (which are 
actually quite low).  Many churches compensate their clergy in an amount commensurate 
with the average salary of the members of the congregation.  This provides a very broad 
range of salaries to choose from when attempting to quantify how much the average 
clergy member receives. 
With regard to benefits, the lack of standardization is similar.  Some churches 
provide their clergy a housing allowance, while others provide a parsonage to live in on 
the grounds of the church.  Some organized churches have benefits packages that rival 
those of some of the top Fortune 500 companies.  Clergy with larger congregations seem 
to fare better.  There are also those churches that don’t provide their clergy with any 
benefits whatsoever.  Even though the level of education most clergy receive is on a par 
with professional occupations, the aggregate compensation packages equal that of social 
workers and school teachers. According to the Duke study, inadequate compensation of 
civilian clergy has driven many prospective members away from pursuing this career.  
C. COMPARISON 
Initially, the figures from the BLS website were used for comparison.  But out of 
concern that many self-employed clergy were excluded from the BLS survey (this might 
bias the associated salary data in an unknown direction), the author decided to use the 
 
35 Becky R. McMillan and Matthew J. Price, Duke Divinity School Pulpit and Pew Research on 
Pastoral Leadership Report, How Much Should We Pay the Pastor?, Winter 2003, 
<http://www.pulpitandpew.duke.edu/salarystudy.pdf> (accessed 29 July 2005). 
36 An example of this is the Wisconsin Conference of the United Church of Christ Clergy 
Compensation Handbook for 2005 which can be accessed online at 
<http://www.wcucc.org/ClgyComp.htm> (accessed 29 July 2005). 
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median Protestant salary from the Duke study, which is substantially higher than the 
Catholic salary.  This higher salary was chosen to bias the results so as to understate the 
Navy’s savings from outsourcing or restructuring. 
With these figures, a basic cost comparison can be accomplished.  As stated 
above, the Navy programs a chaplain at $114,775 per year.  In contrast, a civilian 
clergyman can expect to make about $45,000.   Because the benefits packages of civilian 
clergy are so vague, this figure is raised by 40 percent in an attempt to bias upward the 
civilian compensation, which, again, will bias downward the Navy’s savings.37  This 
would bring the civilian figure to about $63,000.  That amounts to an approximate 
$52,000 difference per year per chaplain.  Even when biasing so as to create a very 
conservative estimate, there seem to be opportunities for a less-costly, but equally-
effective, group of chaplains.  The difficulty is deciding how much of a trade-off between 
the demonstrated cost savings and the perceived benefit losses is acceptable for the 
Department of the Navy.  There are an infinite number of variations on outsourcing and 
restructuring the Chaplain Corps.  These variations and their potential consequences are 
explored in Chapter V. 
 
37 There are many views regarding how much a benefits package should be as a percentage of base 
salary.  Most documents the author encountered put this figure between 25 and 40 percent.  For a more 
detailed discussion of this topic, visit the United States Small Business Administration website at 
<http://www.sba.gov/> (accessed 31 August 2005). 
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V. ESTIMATED GAINS FROM OUTSOURCING OR 
RESTRUCTURING 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
In constructing a set of possible scenarios to illustrate the potential cost savings of 
outsourcing or restructuring the Chaplain Corps, the author must make certain 
assumptions.  The following are a broad group of assumptions. 
1. Combat Chaplains Excluded 
The omission of combat chaplains has been explained in Chapter I.  The specific 
number of personnel associated with this omission is approximately 200.38  This leaves 
about 700 chaplains to be included in the models. 
2. Shipboard Chaplains Divested 
Approximately 100 shipboard chaplains are permanent members of a specific 
ship’s crew.  Their duties are seldom shared with ships that do not possess these types of 
chaplains.  Rather, there is normally a group of chaplains attached to the ship’s parent 
squadron that make infrequent trips among “chaplainless” ships.  The existence of these 
roving chaplains, plus the small percentage of ships that have shipboard chaplains, plus 
the existence of the lay leader program make a reasonable case for the divestiture of 
shipboard chaplains.  The roving squadron chaplains would take over the duties of 
shipboard chaplains and be supplemented by lay leaders in both an outsourced and a 
restructured scenario.  Therefore, regardless of the scenario, an initial annual savings of 
almost $11.5 million could be realized.39
3. Recruiting, Training, and Travel Costs Remain 
Outsourcing or restructuring would significantly decrease the number of chaplains 
in the United States Navy.  There would be a corresponding decrease in the number of 
personnel required to recruit and train these chaplains, and fewer chaplains would mean 
 
38 The numbers of personnel used for this chapter are taken from the “Yellow Pages” document within 
the Chaplain Corps community web pages of the Navy Knowledge Online website, 
<https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/templates/page/library.jsp?foldId=libfold248061> (accessed 19 August 
2005).  The author personally counted chaplain billets and has approximated within a reasonable degree of 
accuracy.  Approximation is necessary due to the transient nature of military officers, and to the transient 
nature of some of the job requirements (e.g. some billets are mobilized for combat in crisis situations). 
39 100 (divested chaplains) X $114,775 (Navy’s annual officer programming rate) = $11,477,500. 
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fewer chaplains using travel funds.  However, these costs would remain in part, if only to 
prepare the combat chaplains for their tours of duty.  Additionally, the chaplains 
remaining to supervise the Corps would still need training in leadership and management.  
Therefore, it is assumed that these costs would not represent a significant savings, and 
would remain within the annual budget of the Navy. 
4. Sufficient Civilian Religious Infrastructure 
Most shore duty billets for chaplains are in Fleet concentration areas such as 
Norfolk, Virginia or San Diego, California.  Some are in Washington D.C. and there are 
other chaplains sprinkled around the world at other bases, Naval hospitals, and training 
centers.  The vast majority of these areas have civilian populations with associated 
churches, synagogues, and temples of most religious flavors.  Civilian infrastructure must 
be sufficient to support either the types of outsourcing or restructuring that the author is 
presenting for review.  “Sufficient” is a highly subjective term.  An internet search of the 
greater San Diego area revealed the existence of over 400 churches.  A similar search of 
the Norfolk area also discovered that there were over 400 churches.  The author would 
assign these numbers to the “sufficient” category, and it is assumed that a robust network 
of churches currently exists around most bases. 
5. Service Member Indifference 
This is a big assumption, and one for which the author has only informal data.  In 
order for outsourcing to be successful, the average sailor must be indifferent as to 
whether or not the chaplain has a commission.  In order for restructuring to be successful, 
the average sailor must be indifferent as to whether or not services are held on the base.  
One chaplain with whom the author spoke lamented the lack of participation in on-base 
services.  Informally, the author has questioned over 200 military officers at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA about their preference for a military chaplain over 
civilian clergy.40  Less than five percent of them used the religious services that the 
military provided on a regular basis, and about the same percentage of officers were 
indifferent as to whether or not the chaplain had a military commission.  Although it is 
 
40 This informal survey was conducted over a year’s period of time, from July of 2004 to July of 2005.  
The author simply asked service members if they attended church at the base chapel, and if they would 
prefer military chaplains over civilian clergy. 
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difficult to support this assumption without a formal survey, it appears that many service 
members are indifferent about the source of religious representation. 
B. OUTSOURCING 
An outsourcing scenario would begin within the guidelines outlined in OMB 
Circular A-76.  The various jobs that chaplains perform at shore establishments would be 
offered to the public, the bidding process would begin, and contracts would be drawn up.  
Based on need, the Navy could offer one-year, renewable contracts to the required 
number of eligible churches that are currently part of the endorsing system in place.41  
These contracts would be for duty at most non-combat related establishments that 
currently have chaplain billets.  The squadron chaplains who may visit ships could also 
have their jobs outsourced.42  After one year, the contracts could be renewed.  From this 
pool of initial civilian clergy, the Navy could draw its necessary number of combat 
chaplains.  To address career progression and rotation concerns (chaplains would not 
want to stay in combat billets indefinitely), certain shore billets would not be outsourced.  
These would include billets at recruit depots, service academies, and all levels of 
administration.  Leaving approximately 100 shore billets to rotate into43, and taking 
account of the above assumptions, would make about 500 jobs eligible for outsourcing.44  
The annual savings garnered from this outsourcing would be a function of the price bid, 
but the figures in Chapter IV are used as a guideline.  With a $52,000 difference per 
chaplain per year plus the $11.5 million saved from shipboard divestiture, the possible 
annual savings to the U.S. taxpayer is roughly $37.5 million.45
 
 
41 There used to be a Navy instruction, SECNAV 1730.3G, Employment of Civilian Clergy, detailing 
this process.  According to a senior chaplain at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, this instruction has 
been cancelled and the subject of contracting will be contained in a forthcoming instruction. 
42 Civilian services are regularly performed onboard underway ships.  The Navy College Program for 
Afloat College Education (NCPACE) program, where civilian college professors administer undergraduate 
courses onboard Navy ships, is one of these services. 
43 This is admittedly a small number of rotational billets relative to other Navy communities.  
However, this relatively small number of rotational billets would be a strong disincentive to careerism for 
military chaplains. 
44 900 (current strength) – 200 (combat excluded) – 100 (shipboard divested) – 100 (rotational billets) 
= 500 (eligible for outsourcing). 
45 500 (outsourced chaplains) X $52K (price difference) = $26 million.  Add this to $11.5 million to 
get $37.5 million. 
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1. Problems 
There are some problems associated with outsourcing.  One problem is that the 
bidding churches might not represent enough variation to establish a pluralistic 
environment of religious leaders.  Certain churches may not find it financially worthwhile 
for its clergy to serve the military.  For instance, it is reasonable to suppose that there are 
churches that have earning potential greater than the “going outsourcing rate,” and it is 
doubtful that they would ever offer the lowest price in a bidding situation.46  To make up 
for this shortfall, the military might have to petition certain churches for clergy who 
would be willing to serve at a lower-than-normal salary.  This would invite charges of 
government establishment of religion.  Another problem that would remain with 
outsourcing is a possible attitude of careerism.  With contracts being for a finite period of 
time, there would be great pressure to become politically attractive as a potential 
returning chaplain.  For those chaplains who wish to make military service a long-term 
venture, it is reasonable to suppose that their focus would be on maintaining their jobs at 
the exclusion of providing quality religious care.  Despite these qualitative shortfalls of 
outsourcing, following this course of action would create a definite savings of tax dollars.  
However, there seems to be a better way to save some money, maintain religious 
freedoms, and avoid the entanglements of pluralism, careerism, and First Amendment 
issues. 
C. RESTRUCTURING 
A restructuring scenario would involve the divestiture of all extraneous chaplain 
billets.  This would amount to the removal of approximately 500 jobs.  Sailors would 
have to rely on the surrounding civilian religious infrastructure for worship opportunities.  
There may be some areas where there aren’t sufficient civilian resources, but they would 
be very few.  These jobs would be added to the rotational billets for purposes outlined 
above.  The current endorsing system would remain intact, but there would be fewer 
chaplains recruited each year to satisfy the combat requirements and the rotational shore 
requirements.  An added benefit of a smaller Chaplain Corps is a smaller bureaucracy to 
manage it.  As billets disappear, so does the requirement for oversight and supervision. 
 
46 Recall the range of civilian clergy salaries from the Duke study in Chapter IV (Inflation adjusted: 
$18,646 to $76,845).  The lower salaried churches could consistently outbid the higher salaried churches. 
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The religious infrastructure that has been constructed already is a sunk cost.  Base 
chapels have already been paid for, and they could remain to be used as community 
centers.  Additionally, visiting clergy from the local community could hold services there 
on a rotational basis, free of charge.  This would solve the problem of transportation for 
sailors who don’t have the means to travel off base.47
Restructuring in this way would take many years, as the Navy would most likely 
allow chaplains on track for retirement to finish their careers.  Additionally, there would 
have to be a large decrease in current recruiting.  The existing Corps strength of 900 
would need to cycle through the series of obligated tour lengths and begin to dwindle 
down to the projected number of 300 military chaplains.  To the U.S. taxpayer, the long-
run annual savings of divesting 500 extraneous shore based chaplains could amount to 
over $57 million.48  Add this to the $11.5 million from the 100 shipboard chaplains 
already discussed, and the potential annual savings of restructuring the Chaplain Corps 




















47 When the author was discussing these issues with chaplains, the lack of transportation was often 
brought up as a reason to have on-base services.  While the author disagrees that this is a problem (most 
junior enlisted have, if nothing else, a vehicle), the “problem” could be solved by bringing civilian clergy 
onto the base if needed.  Many civilian pastors and priests with whom the author spoke had regularly 
donated their services at some point in their careers. 
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VI. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO CHANGE 
A. SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS 
Special interest groups are often called by other names: pressure groups, 
lobbyists, trade associations, labor unions, particularistic groups, or, simply, interest 
groups.  A special interest group is a collection of like-minded people who seek to 
influence the government in some fashion.  The term “special” is used because the issues 
that the group is concerned about disproportionately affect the members of that group, 
relative to nonmembers.  For instance, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), a 
powerful labor union, favors high tariffs and trade barriers on imported steel.  This 
creates higher prices for American steel consumers, but significantly increases 
employment and wages for American steel producers.  The significant benefits per 
member of the USWA create incentives to pursue these trade barriers, while the cost of 
the price increase per individual consumer is not significant enough for him to expend 
energy opposing the trade barriers.49  Similarly, the cost per American taxpayer to 
maintain the Chaplain Corps is small compared with the benefit per military chaplain. 
There are a couple of broad reasons for creating special interest groups: (1) 
dissatisfaction with current government policy or (2) the desire to maintain current 
government policy.  The goal of these groups is often to maintain a given share of a 
government budget or, perhaps, to increase that share.  Interest groups are arguably a 
necessary function within a democratic society that champions the free exercise of ideas 
and espouses a concern for diverse viewpoints.  They are mentioned here not to make a 
value judgment about special interest groups, but to classify the behavior of the U.S. 
Navy Chaplain Corps as similar to the behavior of these groups.  This special interest 





49 For the classic view of special interest group motivation, see Mancur Olson’s The Logic of 
Collective Action, Harvard University Press, 1965. 
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1. The Chaplain Coalition 
Disgruntled taxpayers have challenged the constitutionality of military chaplaincy 
in the past, but various court opinions have upheld the legitimacy of military chaplains by 
virtue of the military lifestyle.50  It is reasonable to assume that these types of challenges 
serve to create bonds among military chaplains.  It affords them a common cause against 
which to rally. 
The Military Chaplains’ Association of the United States of America (MCA) is a 
non-profit group in Washington, D.C. that represents the interests of chaplains in all of 
the Armed Services, the National Guard, the Civil Air Patrol, and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs.  It was established in 1925 and granted a federal charter by Congress in 
1950.  The MCA refers to itself as a “professional support organization,” an “advocacy 
group,” and “the voice of the chaplaincy.”51  In other words, it is a lobbying organization 
that protects the interests, as its executive sees them, of military chaplains nationwide.  
Among all other military occupational communities, it is unique; that is, no other 
organization like it exists to represent a particular military occupation before Congress.52
B. CREATING VALUE IN THE 21ST CENTURY NAVY 
In 2002, then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, unveiled a new 
vision for the transformation of Navy and Marine Corps forces.  This new vision, called 
Sea Power 21, called for sweeping changes in the way the Department of the Navy 
approached its offensive, defensive, and joint operating capabilities.53  Additionally, Sea 
Power 21 outlined projected changes in the organizational processes of manpower, 
personnel, and training.  Sea Warrior and the Human Capital Strategy were touted as 
methods to streamline the force in ways that fully optimized Navy personnel.  Much of 
 
50 See the opinions of Katcoff v. Marsh 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) or Township v. Schempp 374 U.S. 
203 (1963), both of which defended the military chaplaincy on the basis that instances of military service 
prohibited the free exercise of religion, and that military chaplains existed to support that free exercise. 
51 Its website contains detailed information about the organization and can be found at 
<http://www.mca-usa.org/> (accessed 08 September 2005). 
52 There are groups such as the American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars that represent 
service members as a whole, but military chaplains have created an exclusive group. 
53 The October 2002 issue of Proceedings magazine outlines this vision in its infancy: 
<http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/proCNO10.htm> (accessed 08 September 2005).  To date, 
Sea Power 21 has gone through transformations of its own, and continues to direct the strategic course of 
the present day Navy. 
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the fine print of this initiative was related to downsizing.  In the enlisted realm, there 
were programs created to strip job specialties of unnecessary personnel.  Presently, ships 
continue to lose manpower as technology replaces large crews. 
This transformation led the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps, just as it led other Navy 
communities, to assert and attempt to maintain its own value within this new paradigm.  
In April 2005, Chief of Chaplains, Rear Admiral Louis Iasiello distributed White Letter 
#7, his plan for a value-added 21st century Chaplain Corps.54  This document outlined the 
future of the Corps as a function of Sea Power 21 and the Sea Warrior initiatives.  A 
Human Care Strategy was devised and the whole process was termed Sea Chaplaincy 21.  
Additionally, this letter outlined an indistinct bureaucracy in order to make the Chaplain 
Corps “an operational-centric staff corps,” and, in order to implement this new plan, it 
gave a timeline of “months and perhaps years.” 
Basically, the Chaplain Corps is attempting to create a Sea Warrior Ministry 
Council (SWMC) in numerous geographic areas.55  Each SWMC would direct the actions 
of the next level of chaplains, the Operational Ministry Center (OMC).  An OMC would 
be part of a Regional Support Organization responsible for the operational support of all 
ships within its purview.  The senior chaplain within the OMC would direct the actions of 
an RMT56 by sending chaplains where they are needed within the operational spectrum 
(e.g. assignment to a Carrier Strike Group).  Additionally, a Regional Ministry Center 
(RMC) would be implemented alongside the OMC in order to provide shore services for 
that area’s community of service members and their families.  This entire process is 
supposed to “meet the emergent needs of the Sea Services in transition [and] build on the 
legacy of the past with eyes focused on the future.” 
1. Old Wine, New Bottles 
Sea Chaplaincy 21 does not seem to be a more streamlined, value-added approach 
to ministry.  In short, it appears to be an opportunity to create more chaplains and more 
 
54 The entire letter may be found online at 
<http://www.chaplain.navy.mil/Attachments/White%20Letters/White%20Letter%207.pdf> (accessed 25 
July 2005). 
55 The locations of these SWMCs are Norfolk, VA, Mayport, FL, Groton, CT, San Diego, CA, 
Bremerton, WA, Pearl Harbor, HI, and Yokosuka, Japan. 
56 See Chapter 3, Section A3, Religious Duties. 
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bureaucracy designed to preserve the legacy of military chaplaincy.  Although the focus 
of Sea Chaplaincy 21 is supposed to be on operational factors, there is no mention within 
the document of restructuring the already-oversized shore contingent of the Chaplain 
Corps.  In fact, some of the shore billets that currently exist were created simply to 
manage its sheer size.  Instead of having one central bureaucracy in Washington D.C., 
Sea Chaplaincy 21 intends to create six more all over the country in the form of these 
SWMCs.  Layer upon layer of administration is forecasted in order to deliver more 
ministry to the sailors and their families.  By stating the timeline for implementation in 
terms of years, the Chaplain Corps appears to be readying itself for future scrutiny.  
Patience will potentially be requested from manpower planners so that the Human Care 
Strategy has time to flourish, as all the while the Corps grows.  Ultimately, this new and 
improved Chaplain Corps does not seem to offer anything new but packaging. 
Perhaps this assessment is too harsh.  The author does not begrudge the Chaplain 
Corps in its quest for relevance.  It is human nature to fight for existence, and the 
members of the Corps are acting accordingly.  However, if any real change is to be 
effected, the motives behind the Chaplain Corps’ actions must be clarified.  The interests 
of the few seem to be to charge the many (taxpayers) for potentially unnecessary 
services.  As the Department of the Navy downsizes and optimizes its forces, so must the 
Chaplain Corps. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. WANTS VERSUS NEEDS 
This paper has addressed the issue of military chaplains from many angles: 
economic, pragmatic, emotional, and rational.  Underlying the entire debate is the 
concept of limited resources.  With enough resources, the United States Navy could fund 
many valuable quality-of-life programs that would benefit service members in positive 
and meaningful ways.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Defense resources are limited, 
and manpower planners must decide which programs are “wants” and which ones are 
“needs.”  Ultimately, in a defense setting where fighting and winning the nation’s wars 
are the military’s primary functions57, comprehensive religious care for everyone is not a 
core competency. 
The author has shown that service members’ religious freedoms need not be 
attended to by commissioned officers.  Religious tasks are remarkably similar among 
military chaplains and civilian clergy.  The assumption that military expertise is required 
for effective ministry to service members is mistaken; civilian clergy readily minister to 
service members every day.  The opportunity to worship freely in civilian settings is a 
viable alternative to inclusive chaplaincy programs at every military installation.  
Although pluralism is necessary for such a diverse constituency as the United States 
military, a pluralistic religious market is alive and well in the private sector.  Perhaps it is 
a good idea for military members to go off-base to integrate with their surrounding 
communities; this interaction would help bridge the often-touted civil-military gap. 
Fiscally, the potential savings associated with restructuring are significant.  With 
perhaps little or no change in the quality of religious services, the savings would be tens 
of millions of dollars per year.  Efficient practices and conscientious accounting are vital 
for the continued support of the nation’s people.  Optimizing manpower and removing 
the bureaucracy associated with the Chaplain Corps is a sensible response to the needs of 
the taxpayers and to the mandates of current Naval leadership. 
 
57 Taken from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004 National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America, page 2, which states that “the Armed Forces’ foremost task is to fight and win wars.” 
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The military chaplaincy’s defense of its own position within the military should 
be recognized as an attempt at maintaining its current billet structure, and subsequently 
causing an unnecessary pull on the public purse.  It is the author’s view that the majority 
of Navy chaplains are miscoded as militarily essential, and their ranks will continue to 
grow under their new vision for the 21st century.  If this paper does nothing else, it is the 
author’s hope that it will at least remove the notion that the necessity of military 
chaplains in all settings is a foregone conclusion.  The United States taxpayers, who, 
incidentally, include U.S. service members, deserve a thorough auditing of Chaplain 
Corps’ billets in the spirit of OMB’s duty to reduce unnecessary burdens on the public.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Throughout the course of this research, the author found numerous areas in which 
further analysis could add depth to the subject of religious representation within the 
military.  Although not exhaustive, the following list of topics is relevant for future 
discussions of resource allocation. 
1. Fleetwide Survey 
Informal surveys (like the author’s) are often dismissed in favor of more scientific 
analysis in which questions are carefully worded and responses are meticulously 
recorded.  A significant source of validity could be gained by conducting a fleetwide 
survey that encompasses a large cross section of the military population.  Simple 
questions could be asked relating to religious preferences and the average use of base 
religious ministries.  To avoid ambiguity, service members could be asked outright if 
they would support a manpower reduction in the current Chaplain Corps.  With 
information like this, manpower planners would at least know, with a degree of accuracy, 
the needs of the average service member with regard to military chaplains. 
2. Total Force Review 
If an interested reader decides that the author’s viewpoint is valid, a logical next 
step would be to review the chaplaincies in all of the U.S. Armed Forces.  The U.S. Army 
and the U.S. Air Force maintain sizable numbers of chaplains, and if the Navy decides to 
divest its chaplains, the other services could follow suit.  This study examined only active 
duty chaplains; Selected Reserve chaplains could be included.  Additionally, federal 
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chaplains assigned to federal institutions (like the Department of Veterans Affairs) could 
be analyzed, as tax dollars also fund these chaplains. 
Another interesting idea would be to investigate the possibility of one Chaplain 
Corps, assignable to any service as needed.  Surely, the dispersed efforts of military 
chaplains could be consolidated.  If a chaplain must wear a uniform, it does not make 
sense for the uniform to be specific.  A concentrated total force Chaplain Corps might be 
welcome in this era of transformation and joint operational emphasis. 
3. Religious Program Specialists 
If the Navy restructured its Chaplain Corps, it would also have to restructure the 
Corps’ enlisted counterpart, the Religious Program Specialist (RP) rating.  There are 
approximately 900 RPs on active duty and this number would decline; fewer chaplains 
would require fewer RPs.  There would be additional savings that the author has not 
addressed.  The Navy Yeoman rating historically covered the duties that are now 
performed by RPs (except for the U.S. Marine Corps, which used a Marine soldier to 
accompany the chaplain), so a case could be made for the divestiture of the RP rating.  A 
follow-on study might include a logical restructuring of this enlisted community, and the 
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